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How Does Retirement Affect Health?
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This paper investigates the effects of retirement on various health outcomes. Data stem from 
the first three waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). With this 
informative data, non-parametric matching methods can be applied to identify causal effects. 
It is found that retirement significantly increases the risk of being diagnosed with a chronic 
condition. In particular, it raises the risk of developing a cardiovascular disease and being 
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In the UK, as in many other industrialised countries, the labour force participation of
the elderly has been dramatically decreasing in the last decades (Bloendal and Scarpetta,
1999). The median retirement age has decreased from 65 to 61 years, while average life
expectancy has risen by three years and age of ¯nishing full time education has risen by
two years (Banks and Smith, 2006). The declining ratio of economically active to inactive
individuals raises concerns about the sustainability of pensions and other welfare systems.
As a consequence, British policymakers have implemented a bundle of policies that aim
to raise the economic activity of the elderly: eligibility rules for disability bene¯ts have
been tightened, special measures for unemployed people over 50 have been introduced,
mandatory early retirement and age discrimination have been abolished. Furthermore,
the British government has raised the o±cial state pension age: it will gradually increase
from 60 to 65 by 2020 for women; and from 65 to 68 for both men and women between
2024 and 2046.
Delaying the retirement age, though, might have consequences for the health of the el-
derly. Retirement is accompanied by many basic life changes: time availability, income
streams, social networks, social status and so on. Lifestyle changes are likely to a®ect the
retiree's state of health. This aspect of retirement is often neglected when implementing
policies which aim to raise the e®ective retirement age. However, if retirement a®ects
health outcomes, the welfare e®ects of policy changes may di®er in crucial ways. Firstly,
the well-being of the growing number of elderly people is determined by policies regulat-
ing retirement to which many elderly people are exposed. Secondly, health care spending
depends on how retirement a®ects health. Thirdly, policies regulating retirement could
widen or close health inequalities between the wealthy and the poor, as they probably
have a larger impact on retirement decisions made by the elderly with sparse ¯nancial
resources.
Little is known about the health e®ects of retirement. Establishing causal links is aggra-
vated by selection into retirement. For instance, it has been well established that poor
health causes economic inactivity (see Disney, Emmerson, and Wake¯eld (2006) and Rice,
1Roberts, and Jones (2007) for the UK; the seminal study by Bound, Schoenbaum, Stine-
brickner, and Waidmann (1999) or Conti, Berndt, and Frank (2006) for the US; Riphahn
(1999) and Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2004) for Germany; Lindeboom and Kerkhofs
(2002) for the Netherlands; and Au, Crossley, and Schellhorn (2005) for Canada). Poor
health, though, is also likely to a®ect later health outcomes and hence confounds the
analysis. Besides health itself, there are also other factors that simultaneously a®ect the
decision to retire and later health outcomes. When employing di®erent identi¯cation
strategies to this non-random selection into retirement, previous studies ¯nd con°icting
evidence (see Charles (2002); Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic (2006) and Coe and Linde-
boom (2008) for the US; and Morris, Cook, and Shaper (1994) and Bound and Waidmann
(2007) for the UK).
This paper aims to estimate health e®ects of retirement in England. It contributes to
the existing literature by using a very comprehensive data set: the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA). This data allows us to control for potential confounders, e.g.
initial health, income, pensions, and anticipations. Furthermore, it exploits information
on the dates of retirement and the diagnoses of chronic disease. Thus, reverse causality
can be ruled out, i.e. we can observe whether individuals retire before or after a new
diagnosis was made. Moreover, this paper provides estimates for a subpopulation of gen-
eral interest, namely the retirees. This is in contrast to instrumental variable studies
that provide estimates for the subpopulation who responded to the instrument. Further-
more, this paper applies non-parametric matching methods, i.e. it does not need to rely
on any functional form assumptions and also allows for individual e®ect heterogeneity.
In addition, the applied method provides estimates on the selection into the retirement
state. Understanding the selection process per se is important from a policy perspective:
if policies aim to raise the economic activity of elderly people, having insights into its
determinants is crucial. Thus, this paper also contributes to the debate on whether ¯nan-
cial or health variables are more important for determining the retirement decision (see
Lindeboom (2006) for a discussion).
2We ¯nd that retirement increases the risk of being diagnosed with a chronic condition, e.g.
heart attack, stroke, or cancer. However, we can only observe the date of the diagnosis
and not the onset of the disease. Under the assumption that onset and diagnosis coincide,
this result suggests that retirement on average harms individuals. Furthermore, there is
evidence suggesting that there is a considerable e®ect heterogeneity: retirement does not
a®ect every individual in the same way. These results are in contrast to the study by
Bound and Waidmann (2007), who ¯nd no evidence for the negative health e®ects of re-
tirement in the UK and some positive e®ects for men. Results are in line with evidence by
Morris, Cook, and Shaper (1994), who ¯nd that mortality due to cardiovascular diseases
and cancer is signi¯cantly increased for male retirees in the UK.
In Section 2, retirement in the UK is described, the potential mechanism through which
retirement a®ects health is discussed and the literature on the health e®ects of retire-
ment is reviewed. Section 3 describes the data, the sample selection mechanism, and the
de¯nition of retirement and the health outcomes. It provides descriptive statistics and
discusses health-related attrition. Section 4 is dedicated to the methodology: the identi¯-
cation strategy and its plausibility are discussed and the matching estimator is described.
Section 5 presents estimation results for the determinants and health e®ects of retirement.
The ¯nal section o®ers a conclusion.
2 Background
2.1 Retirement in the United Kingdom
Individuals decide to retire based on their personal situation within an institutional con-
text. The pension system is likely to a®ect retirement decisions by setting incentives. The
UK pension system has two tiers.1 The ¯rst tier is a Basic State Pension (BSP). It is a
very low (less than $ 100 per week) °at-rate bene¯t. Individuals above the state pension
age (currently 65 for men and 60 for women) are entitled if they have paid National Insur-
ance contributions for at least 25% of their working life. The second tier is compulsory for
1Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2002), and Emmerson and Johnson (2001) and Banks and Smith (2006)
provide an extensive overview on the UK pension system.
3all employees earning more than a certain amount. They have to contribute either to the
State Second Pension (default option) or to a private pension scheme. In the State Second
Pension, the entitlement depends on employment and earnings history, and is basically in
proportion to average earnings. Alternatively, individuals can opt out and have either an
employer provided or an individually arranged pension. Since many employees chose this
option, private pensions matter more for retirement decision in the UK compared to other
countries. Private pensions can take either the form of a de¯ned bene¯t (DB) or a de¯ned
contribution (DC) scheme. In DB schemes, pensions are based on a formula involving
age, years of salary and services. They have been found to encourage early retirement
(Blundell, Meghir, and Smith, 2002). They also set incentives (i) to stay in work until
the early retirement age (which is usually below the state pension age) and (ii) to work
full time until that age instead of taking gradual retirement. In DC schemes, money is
invested in a fund and the size of the fund determines income at retirement. They usually
do not set incentives to retire at a certain age.
2.2 Mechanisms through which retirement a®ects health
In economic theory, health is considered to be both an investment good, allowing for
higher productivity and fewer sick days, and a consumption good providing direct utility
(Grossman, 1972). With retirement, incentives to invest in health in order to raise pro-
ductivity cease to exist. Still, individuals gain from investing in their health as it raises
their utility. The e®ects of retirement depend on how the marginal cost of investing in
health capital and marginal bene¯ts from enjoying better health change, which in turn
depends on how the marginal value of time changes (Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic, 2006).
For instance, if the value of time declines after retirement, the time cost for investing in
health such as visiting a physician or cooking healthy food is reduced. Simultaneously, the
marginal bene¯t of having better health declines when time is less valued after retirement.
Thus, the theoretical e®ect of retirement is ambiguous and likely to be heterogeneous for
individuals with di®erent preferences.
There are also other channels through which retirement might a®ect health besides chang-
4ing incentives to invest in health. Retirement might have psycho-social consequences. It
is often viewed as a stressful life event (Minkler, 1981) and has been ranked in tenth place
out of 43 life events in an attempt to measure stress as a predictor of illness (Holmes and
Rahe, 1967). Life events are de¯ned as discrete experiences that disrupt an individual's
usual activities, causing a substantial change and readjustment. Depending on individ-
ual coping resources, life events can cause stress, even if they are perceived as positive.
Stress, however, is known to in°uence health by a®ecting health habits such as smoking,
drinking, sleeping, eating and exercising (Brannon and Feist, 1997), by deteriorating the
immune system, endocrine and cardio-vascular reactivity (Ader, Felten, and Cohen, 2001)
and by causing negative a®ect such as anxiety or depression which itself negatively a®ects
health outcomes (Scheier and Bridges, 1995). Health consequences of stress are inter alia
depression, cardio-vascular diseases, infection (Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, and Miller, 2007),
and possibly cancer (Kiecolt-Glaser and Glaser, 1999). On the other hand, retirement
might not cause stress at all, but might be instead a relief from a stressful working life.
Then, retirement would consequently be expected to have positive health e®ects.
Irrespective of stress, there is evidence suggesting that health behaviour changes with
economic activity; these changes, though, can harm or promote health. For instance,
retirees were found to be more likely to quit smoking (Lang, Rice, Wallace, Guralnik,
and Melzer, 2007); to engage in regular exercise; and to have lower stress levels (Midanik,
Soghikian, Ransom, and Tekawa, 1995). But it has also been found that they have re-
duced social interactions (Sugisawa, Sugisawa, Nakatani, and Shibata, 1997), increased
problematic alcohol consumption (Perreira and Sloan, 2001) and gain weight (Forman-
Ho®man, Richardson, Yankey, Hillis, Wallace, and Wolinsky, 2008).
In general, we would not expect that retirement categorically harms or bene¯ts individ-
uals. Most likely, individual characteristics and circumstances of retirement in°uence
health e®ects of retirement. For instance, there is evidence that employees' failure to con-
trol retirement according to their wishes adversely a®ects health (Solinge, 2007) and that
marital context plays an important role on retirement well-being (Szinovacz and Davey,
2004).
52.3 Literature
While the mere association between retirement and health is found to be negative, empir-
ical studies have provided con°icting evidence on the causal e®ects of retirement. Besides
the presumption that there is a considerable e®ect heterogeneity, another potential ex-
planation for this discrepancy is that the applied strategies identify di®erent e®ects. For
instance, when addressing the problem that health and retirement are jointly determined,
one strategy is to ¯nd an instrumental variable that only a®ects the endogenous retire-
ment decision, but does not a®ect the health outcome. This approach identi¯es the local
average treatment e®ect (LATE), i.e. the e®ect of retirement for the subpopulation whom
the instrument has induced to retire. However, the LATE can considerably deviate from
the average treatment e®ect (ATE), i.e. the e®ects of retirement for the whole population,
and the average treatment e®ect on the treated (ATET), i.e. the e®ects of retirement for
the retirees.2 It can even have the opposite sign. Indeed, instrumental variables studies
tend to ¯nd positive e®ects of retirement, while studies that control for confounding vari-
ables tend to ¯nd negative e®ects.
One example for an instrumental variable strategy is Charles (2002). He proposes age
speci¯c retirement incentives in the US, a change in the US pension system, and coverage
by a retirement rule as instruments. He ¯nds that men feel `lonely' or `depressed' less
often after retirement. E®ects are considerable and range between 6 and 28 percentage
points. However, if individuals anticipate that there are ¯nancial incentives to retire at
a certain age, or that there will be a change in the pension system3, they adjust their
behaviour before retirement. This may result in estimates biased upwards, i.e. more ben-
e¯cial health e®ects of retirement are found than are actually the case. There is also the
concern whether the instruments are valid, i.e. whether they have no direct e®ect on the
health outcome and whether they are uncorrelated with any other variable that a®ects
health. For instance, the ¯rst assumption would be violated if reaching a certain age
(turning `60') had direct psychological e®ects; the second assumption would be violated if
2For a discussion on the instrumental variables approach see Deaton (2009); Heckman and Urzua (2009)
and the response by Imbens (2009).
3The social security amendment was signed in 1983 and was enacted in the early 90's.
6individuals with a certain latent health state are more likely to chose jobs with mandatory
retirement.
A similar approach has been adopted by Bound and Waidmann (2007) for England, by
Neuman (2007) for the US, and by Coe and Zamarro (2008) for eleven European countries.
These studies use pension eligibility as a source of exogenous variation and ¯nd overall
positive health e®ects of retirement. As above, there is the concern that anticipation of
the pension age might bias estimates upwards. While the latter studies use a standard
regression discontinuity approach, Bound and Waidmann (2007) compare linear trends of
health indicators before and after state pension age. However, many elderly people cease
to work before they have reached the state pension age4. To the extent that they retire
earlier due to ill-health, this would bias retirement e®ects upwards. There is also the
concern that their estimates are based on rather di®erent cohorts.5 Furthermore, ¯tting
a linear trend for health variables seems to be a strong assumption.
Coe and Lindeboom (2008) circumvent the problem of anticipation by using the o®er of
retirement windows as instrument. Using US data, they ¯nd no signi¯cant retirement
e®ects. A potential concern, though, is that ¯rms o®er retirement incentives to workers
who vary in their health or in other characteristics that determine their health, which
would lead to biased estimates.
Other studies base their identi¯cation on controlling for the selection into the retirement
state. One example for this approach is Dave, Rashad, and Spasojevic (2006). Using US
data, they ¯nd that retirement increases depression by 6 to 9 percent, illness conditions
by 5 to 6 percent and di±culties associated with mobility and daily activities by 5 to
16 percent. They estimate ¯xed e®ects models, which can control for unobserved time-
invariant (but not for time-varying) heterogeneity across individuals. In order to avoid
reverse causality, they stratify their sample across individuals who had no major illnesses
or health problems in the waves prior to the retirement wave. They argue that for these
individuals retirement is more likely to be exogenous to health. However, they cannot
4In ELSA wave 2 (which is the sample in Bound and Waidmann (2007)), 18% of males and 8% of
females are retired before they reached state pension age.
5Their sample includes 53 to 89-year-olds.
7control for health shocks that occurred between the last interview before retirement and
time of retirement. To the extent that these unobserved health shocks drove individuals
out of the labour market, the negative e®ects of retirement might be overestimated.
The same caveat applies to the ¯ndings by Bamia, Trichopoulou, and Trichopoulos (2007)
who can only condition on initial health, but cannot rule out reverse causation. Using
Greek data, they ¯nd that in comparison to individuals still employed, retirees had a
51% increase in overall mortality. Findings were similar for cardiovascular mortality and
cancer mortality, although the latter was not signi¯cant.
In contrast, Morris, Cook, and Shaper (1994) can exclude that loss of employment was
due to ill health. Furthermore, they can control for age, region, social class, health be-
haviour and health at baseline. Using British data, they ¯nd that men who retire due to
other reasons than ill health and who were apparently healthy at baseline had an 86%
increase in mortality compared to men who remained continuously employed. In particu-
lar, they had a signi¯cant increase in both cardiovascular mortality and cancer mortality.
Still some sceptics might argue that the ¯ndings rather re°ect subtle unreported health
problems that have contributed to the decision to retire, as noted by Trichopoulos (1996).
In this paper, a wider range of confounding factors is taken into account. In particular,
the data allow us to control for anticipations with respect to health and work as well
as for ¯nancial variables. Furthermore, initial health is not only measured by subjective
means, but also by objective means and at more points in time. Another advantage of
this paper is that we can exploit information on the date of diagnosis and of retirement
to avoid reverse causality. Furthermore, our estimates do not rely on any functional form
assumptions and allow for arbitrary e®ect heterogeneity. Finally, it provides estimates
on the average treatment e®ects for all retirees, which might be more interesting than
estimates for the subpopulation for which the instrument induced retirement.
83 Data
3.1 Sample selection, de¯nition of retirement and health outcomes
Data stems from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA is a panel
survey of people born before 1952 who live in England. It collects substantial informa-
tion on health measures (including nurse visits), health behaviour, employment, earnings,
wealth, pensions, expectations about future health and paid work, and other household
and individual demographics. The Appendix provides further information on ELSA.
We consider a sample of individuals who are employed at the ¯rst ELSA wave. For some
of them, we observe transition to retirement at the second wave. For these individuals,
we aim to estimate the health e®ects of retirement by comparing their subsequent health
states with similar individuals who remain employed. At wave 1, we observe 2906 em-
ployed individuals, where an individuals is considered to be employed if he responds that
(i) being \employed" describes his current situation best and (ii) \paid work" was one of
his activities in the last month. Out of them, 1803 individuals remain employed at wave
2 and 268 become retired, where an individual is considered to be retired if she responds
that (i) \retired" describes her current situation best and (ii) \not in paid work" was
her activity in the last month. Out of the individuals who retired at wave 2, 192 are
still retired at wave 3. For these individuals, we will analyse the health e®ects in most
of our speci¯cations. Out of the individuals who have been employed at the two prior
waves, 1247 individuals are still employed at the third wave. Based on these individuals,
we will estimate counterfactual health outcomes that we would observe in the absence of
retirement. Thus, our main sample consists of the 1439 individuals who are either still
employed or still retired at wave 3. (Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the detailed
sample selection mechanism.) As we lose many individuals due to non-response, we will
discuss attrition as a potential source of bias in Section 3.3.
A range of health measures is provided in ELSA: diagnosed cardiovascular or other chronic
conditions, symptomatic angina or depression, biological measures of physical health such
as body mass index, blood pressure, risk factors or lung function. However, most of these
9measures are only observed at the time of the interview. In order to rule out reverse causal-
ity, we would like to know whether ill health drove individuals out of work or whether
they experienced a health shock after retirement. Unfortunately, due to a coding error
almost all of the retired individuals (262 out of 268) were not asked for the reasons of their
(early) retirement. For newly diagnosed conditions, however, it is possible to exploit the
timing of events in order to avoid reverse causality. The respondents are asked in which
month a new diagnosis was made. Retirees are also asked when their job ended. Under
the assumption that recall bias is minimal (which seems to be reasonable for life events
such as retirement or the diagnosis of a chronic condition), it is possible to determine
whether retired individuals experienced a health shock before or after their retirement.
The diagnosis of a new condition is considered to be an outcome variable only if it was
made after retirement. If the diagnosis was made before retirement, it is considered to
be a potentially confounding variable, since it might a®ect the retirement decision and
also increase vulnerability to other health conditions. In order to avoid bias, we want to
control for this confounding health shock prior to retirement. For individuals in the con-
trol group, though, the retirement date does not exist. We follow the approach suggested
by Lechner (1999) and simulate retirement dates for the control group. We regress the
month of retirement of retired individuals on a set of time invariant personal and regional
characteristics. We use the estimated coe±cients plus a draw in the residual distribution
to predict a corresponding value for non retired individuals. Thus, by ¯nding a control
observation that is comparable at the assigned retirement date, we can control for con-
founding due to health shocks prior to retirement.
Table 1 shows means of new health conditions that have been diagnosed after retire-
ment. This is based on the actual retirement date for the retired individuals and the
simulated retirement date for the employed individuals. The ¯rst two columns show the
mean health outcomes for our main sample. For every retired individual, we can observe
new diagnoses at least up to two years after retirement, since retirement took place before
the wave 2 interview and we have also information from the wave 3 interview two years
later. Around 11% of the employed individuals have been diagnosed with any chronic
10Table 1: Mean health outcomes after retirement
wave 1 to wave 3 wave 1 to wave 2
employed retired employed retired
observations 1247 192 1803 268
any newly diagnosed disease 0.111 0.208 0.052 0.097
new angina, heart attack, or stroke 0.012 0.042 0.007 0.037
new arthritis or cancer 0.064 0.156 0.028 0.056
newly diagnosed angina 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.019
new heart attack 0.006 0.021 0.004 0.019
new stroke 0.004 0.021 0.001 0.015
newly diagnosed diabetes 0.022 0.026 0.008 0.007
newly diagnosed arthritis 0.059 0.120 0.025 0.037
newly diagnosed cancer 0.008 0.042 0.004 0.019
newly diagnosed psychiatric condition 0.019 0.026 0.011 0.011
condition (either diabetes, angina, heart attack, stroke, arthritis, cancer or psychiatric
problem). The corresponding percentage for retired individuals is almost twice as high.
Severe cardiovascular diseases (angina, heart attack or stroke) have been diagnosed for
around 1% of the employed and 4% of the retired individuals. When considering the
chronic diseases separately, we notice that in particular arthritis followed by cancer have
been often diagnosed. All considered conditions have been relatively more often diagnosed
for retired than employed individuals. We also have information when a heart failure, de-
mentia and Alzheimer's have been diagnosed, but these conditions were not present for
any individual in our sample.
The last two columns show mean health outcomes when we only take wave 1 and wave
2 into account, but not wave 3. The means are di®erent for two reasons: (i) health out-
comes are only observed at most for two years after retirement and (ii) the sample also
contains individuals who do not respond at wave 3 or switch their state. While the former
necessarily results in smaller means, the latter could potentially result in larger means
if drop-outs have worse health than wave 3 respondents. Indeed, their health is slightly
worse, as will be discussed in Section 3.3. Overall, mean health outcomes are much lower
when wave 3 is not taken into account. Still, the same pattern emerges: retired individuals
have more diagnosed conditions than the employed.
113.2 Descriptives
The di®erences in newly diagnosed conditions in Table 1, however, do not account for
the fact that individuals who retire are quite distinct from individuals who remain em-
ployed. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides means of socio-economic and health variables
for these two groups. The third column shows whether means are signi¯cantly di®erent
according to a standard t-test. As age is one important di®erence, we show in the fourth
column whether age adjusted means in both groups are di®erent. We derive age adjusted
variables by balancing the respective variables on age, age squared and four age dummies
via propensity score matching using an approach similar to the one explained in Section
4.3. Then we apply a t-test. This shows us the extent to which di®erences between retired
and employed are driven by their age di®erences. As all variables are measured before
retirement took place, they are informative on factors playing a role for selection into
retirement.
From the ¯rst row, we see that 50% of the employed and 54% of the retired individuals
are females, but that this di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant. Retired individuals
are on average 60 years old and hence 5 years older than employed individuals. Their
household size is smaller. Their children are less likely to (still) live with them and they
more often have grandchildren. However, the latter is mainly driven by age di®erences,
as age adjusted means are not signi¯cantly di®erent. Retired individuals less often have
an academic degree and more often no quali¯cations. These educational di®erences stem
from age di®erences, as younger cohorts are more likely to have received a higher educa-
tion. No major di®erences are apparent with respect to social classi¯cation.
Retired individuals also had di®erent types of jobs when they were still working. They
worked longer in their current jobs, were less likely to have permanent jobs and worked
for fewer hours per week. They worked less often in ¯rms with 20 to 99 employees and
more often in ¯rms with more than 1000 employees. There are no signi¯cant di®erences
in the type of work related physical activity.
Retired and employed individuals are not much di®erent with respect to regional charac-
teristics such as government o±ce region, population density and an index of deprivation
12with regard to income, employment, health, housing and crime.
There are signi¯cant di®erences with regard to pensions and other ¯nancial variables.
Retired individuals are more likely to have reached the o±cial state pension age at the
second ELSA interview. But 66% of the retired individuals takes retirement before they
are eligible to draw state pensions. This is in line with the ¯nding that state pensions play
a minor role compared to private pensions for retirement incentives (Blundell, Meghir,
and Smith, 2002) in the UK. Retired individuals are more likely to have been o®ered early
retirement incentives before the ¯rst ELSA wave (which they had decided not to take).
But this di®erence vanishes once one adjust for age di®erences, which re°ects that such
incentives have mainly been o®ered to early cohorts. Retirees are more likely to have de-
¯ned bene¯t schemes and less likely to have de¯ned contribution schemes or any private
pension schemes. Interestingly, di®erences in de¯ned bene¯t and contribution schemes
remain signi¯cant once one adjusts for age. This suggests that they do not only re°ect
cohort e®ects, but might also indicate preferences for schemes that set incentives to retire
at a certain age (DB) or to avoid this (DC). Retirees have a higher total pension wealth6
compared to employed individuals. In particular, their private pension wealth is higher.
On average, state pensions contribute to only 30% of their total pension wealth, which
again re°ects their less pronounced role compared to private pensions. Di®erences in
pension wealth remain signi¯cant even after adjustment for age di®erences. Thus, retired
individuals have higher pension funds at their disposal compared to employed individuals
of the same age. Their employment income is lower, but not signi¯cantly di®erent once
one adjusts for age.
Retired individuals di®er also with respect to health variables before retirement. Their
memory is not as good and they have more di±culties with the activities of daily living.
Most of these di®erences stem from the age di®erence. Retirees describe their health more
often as fair as compared to very good or excellent. This di®erence remains signi¯cant
when one controls for age. They more often have a diagnosis of angina, arthritis, osteo-
porosis and cancer, but these di®erences mostly vanish when one adjust for age. There
6Total pension wealth is calculated as the sum of private and state pension wealth assuming retirement
in 2002 (see Banks, Emmerson, and Tetlow (2005) for the exact calculation).
13are no systematic di®erences in symptomatic conditions such as heart attacks and angina
(assessed by the Rose questionnaire), depression (assessed by the Center of Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale) and mental illness (assessed by the twelve item General Health
Questionnaire, see Goldberg and Williams (1988)). Retired individuals already had more
diagnosed conditions at time of the HSE interview.
With regard to health habits, we observe that retirees exercise less often. There are al-
most no signi¯cant di®erences in smoking and drinking behaviour or in having private
health insurance.
When asked to estimate chances to stay alive, employed and retired individuals are not
much di®erent. Retired individuals' subjective probability that they stay in work was
signi¯cantly lower than the one of employed individuals. This di®erence remains signif-
icant even if one adjusts for age. Interestingly, their subjective probability that health
limits their ability to work is also lower, although other health variables suggest that,
on average, their health is worse. One potential explanation for this is that individuals
retiring at wave 2 plan at wave 1 to retire in the next years. Hence, they weigh the
probability of experiencing a health shock that forces them to leave work lower than
individuals who plan to remain in work. However, retired individuals are less likely to
respond to questions about their expectations and it is not clear why they do not respond.
In sum, these di®erences indicate that retired and employed individuals di®er in im-
portant characteristics even before retirement. Age is one important di®erence between
them. Beyond their age di®erences, they also di®er in living arrangements, job charac-
teristics, pension schemes and pension wealth, health and retirement expectations even
after adjustment for age di®erences. Since these variables are likely to a®ect health out-
comes, the worse health states of retired individuals in Table 1 cannot be interpreted by
any means as causal. Instead, when estimating the causal e®ects of retirement, we need
to control for these confounding variables to avoid selection bias. Attrition as another
potential source of confounding is discussed in detail in the next paragraph.
143.3 Health-related attrition
18% of individuals who are employed at wave 1 are lost due to attrition at wave 2 and
another 10% due to attrition at wave 3. High attrition rates are a concern if non-response
is related to health and retirement. Then estimates on the health e®ects of retirement
would be biased. Health-related attrition might occur due to death or serious illness which
prevents individuals from responding or due to moving to institutional care which aggra-
vates tracing individuals. It is another source of selection bias, since observed individuals
are di®erent to individuals in the population.
The reason for non-response at wave 2 is reported in ELSA.7 Table A.3 in the Appendix
reports non-response reasons for the sample under consideration: refusals and not trace-
able are main reasons for drop-outs. Ill health and death seem to play only a minor role.
But, an unknown fraction of individuals with other drop-out reasons than health could
still have dropped out due to health without mentioning it.
Ideally, the response probability should be independent of health given a set of observed
variables. Then the data are said to be missing at random (MAR). However, since the
missing data are not observed, we cannot verify whether they are missing at random
(Nicoletti, 2005). It is only possible to test for selection on observables, but not on un-
observables. However, if we observe selection on observable health variables, this might
give us further insights on the direction of a potential bias due to unobservables.
In order to analyse this issue, the likelihood of response at wave 2 and wave 3 is regressed
on variables from the HSE interview and the ¯rst ELSA wave. These estimates repre-
sent response patterns for the sample under consideration, i.e. they are conditional on
responding and being employed at wave 1. Results from a probit are reported in Table
A.4 in the Appendix. They indicate that individuals with children in their households,
with higher education and from the East Midlands are more likely to respond at wave
2 and wave 3. Individuals who were born outside the UK, who have higher debts and
who do physical work are less likely to respond. Likelihood of response is also re°ected in
compliance at the HSE or ¯rst ELSA interview as measured by missing HSE interviews,
7At the time this paper was written, reason for non-response at wave 3 was not available.
15failure of interviewing all members of the household, refusal of nurse visit or later inter-
view dates. Most importantly, health variables at the ¯rst ELSA wave explain response
rates at wave 2, but - with the exception of bad mental health - not at wave 3. This
suggests that newly experienced health shocks have a rather immediate e®ect on response
rates. Furthermore, we note that the e®ects of wave 1 health variables on wave 2 response
rates are ambiguous: individuals with diagnosed diabetes and who regard a work limiting
health shock as more probable are more likely to drop out; individuals with bad mental
health, diagnosed angina or psychiatric conditions are less likely to drop out. Other health
variables are not signi¯cant and hence were not included in the ¯nal speci¯cation. While
other studies have found that individuals in poor initial health are more likely to drop out
(Jones, Koolman, and Rice, 2006), this pattern does not appear to be very pronounced
in our sample. A possible explanation for the positive e®ects of health conditions on re-
sponse rates might be that individuals with certain conditions have an increased intrinsic
motivation to participate in ELSA, since they would like to bene¯t from the nurse checks
or since they appreciate the value of a health survey for society.
With respect to health-related attrition, we cannot infer much from the observed selec-
tion pattern: health shocks that are caused by retirement are not likely to be systematic
related to variables that explain attrition. For example, suppose that retirement would
cause heart attacks and suppose further that individuals experiencing heart attacks are
more likely to drop out due to deaths. This non-response would only be ignorable if it
was captured by controlling for lagged variables. However, two major risk factors of heart
attack (angina and diabetes) a®ect attrition rates in opposite directions. Still we can in-
fer from Table A.4 that there is scope for health-related attrition. Its direction, however,
remains undetermined. The type of the health shock and its severity are most likely to
be crucial for the direction of bias due to non-response.
In principal, one could narrow the degree of attrition by using a balanced sample of
two instead of three waves. However, an extensive analysis suggests that this does not
contribute to solving the problem (see Section 7.2.3 in the Appendix).
164 Methodology
4.1 Conditional independence assumption as identi¯cation strategy
We base our analysis on the prototypical model of the evaluation literature with a binary
treatment variable (Neyman, 1923; Fisher, 1935; Rubin, 1974, 1979). Let us consider an
individual i who works. In one state of the world the individual retires in the next period
t and in the other state the individual still works. Let Di denote the retirement state of
this individual, i.e. Di = 1 if the individual retires and Di = 0 if not. We are interested
in the e®ect of retirement on a health outcome Yi;t+¿ in period ¿ after retirement has
taken place. Health outcomes are, for instance, developing a certain condition such as
cancer, a cardiovascular disease or depression. We would like to compare for the same
individual the health status if retirement had taken place with the potential health status
if it had not taken place. Let fY 0
i;t+¿;Y 1
i;t+¿g denote the potential health outcomes for this
particular individual. Only one of these potential outcomes can be observed, since the
individual either retires or does not retire. With this notation, we can de¯ne the average
treatment e®ect for the treated (ATET) as the di®erence between potential outcomes for






For being able to estimate the ATET, we need to identify E[Y 0
t+¿jD = 1]. Generally, we
would expect this to be di®erent from the observed value for those who did not retire:
E[Y
0
t+¿jD = 1] 6= E[Y
0
t+¿jD = 0];
since individuals with Di = 1 and individuals with Di = 0 might di®er in various other
characteristics which are directly related to health outcomes. For instance, individuals
who retire are on average older than individuals who do not, but age has a direct impact
on the likelihood of developing a new condition. Our identi¯cation strategy is based on
controlling for all variables X that jointly a®ect D as well as health outcomes Y 0
t+¿, such
17that conditional on X
E[Y
0
t+¿jX = x;D = 1] = E[Y
0
t+¿jX = x;D = 0] 8x 2 Â;
where Â µ sup(XjD = 1). This assumption is referred to as conditional independence
assumption (CIA) in the following. It is also called unconfoundedness in the statistical
literature (Rubin, 1974). We assume that CIA holds for every value of x that lies in the
support of X in the D = 1 population, i.e. Â = sup(XjD = 1) µ sup(XjD = 0).
4.2 Plausibility of the conditional independence assumption given
our data
The most crucial aspect of the identi¯cation strategy relies on being able to observe all
confounding variables X that jointly determine selection into retirement D and health
outcomes Y 0
t+¿. Thus, the question arises, whether this is a plausible assumption with our
data.
From an economic viewpoint there are di®erent sets of factors that might jointly a®ect
the retirement decision and later health outcomes. Age is in many pension schemes a key
determinant for the entitlement of pensions. Age and gender together determine state
pension age. With rising age, the vulnerability to certain health shocks increases. Gender
also a®ects vulnerability to certain diseases. Having children and grandchildren could
a®ect a retirement decision, but might also play a role for the onset of certain conditions.
Education is considered to have a causal e®ect on health (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997),
since more educated individuals are more e±cient producers of health (Grossman, 2000) or
since education increases information about true e®ects of health (Kenkel, 2000). Educa-
tion also determines occupation choices and might a®ect retirement decision. Current and
expected income, wealth and pension bene¯ts clearly determine the retirement decision.
Simultaneously, they determine the extent to which individuals can and want to a®ord a
healthy life style and have access to most e®ective treatment. Geographical factors such
as air pollution, tra±c noise, proximity to recreation areas, and supply of health services
18(number and quality of GPs) have a direct e®ect on health. Simultaneously, they a®ect
retirement decisions, since retirement depends on local labour market conditions such as
unemployment rates, average wages, and job o®ers and also on regional leisure opportu-
nities. Lifestyle itself is likely to be a confounder. Activity level within the job, physical
activity in leisure time, diet, smoking and drinking behaviour are important input factors
for health production. But they are also related to job characteristics and propensity to
retirement. Another set of confounding variables are health variables themselves. Health
has been found to be an important determinant for retiring. Future health outcomes
depend on current and past health, since negative health shocks make individuals more
vulnerable to further health shocks (comorbidities). Therefore, we clearly want to control
for health measures prior to retirement. Anticipation is another issue that needs to be
addressed in this context. If individuals expect deteriorations in their health in the fu-
ture and reduce their life expectations, they might be more likely to retire earlier. Then,
shocks to their health are not to be considered as caused by their retirement. Therefore,
it seems to be crucial to control for individuals expectations when estimating selection
into retirement.
4.3 Non-parametric matching estimation
In the empirical analysis, we use a matching estimator as implemented in Lechner,
Miquel, and Wunsch (2006). The advantage of matching estimators is that they are non-
parametric and that they allow for arbitrary individual e®ect heterogeneity (see Heckman,
Lalonde, and Smith (1999) for matching with binary treatment and Imbens (2004) for a
review on recent advances in this ¯eld). To ease notation we drop time subscripts t + ¿
from the notation. Then, the ATET can be written as
E[Y
1 ¡ Y
0jD = 1] = E[Y jD = 1] ¡ E[Y
0jD = 1]:
The ¯rst term can be estimated by the sample mean in the treated population. The
second term is more di±cult to estimate as this is the average counterfactual outcome,
19i.e. the health of retired individuals that would have been realised if they had not retired.
Using iterated expectations, we can re-write the previous expression as
= E[Y jD = 1] ¡
Z
E[Y
0jX = x;D = 1] ¢ dFXjD=1;
where dFXjD=1 represents the distribution function of X in the D = 1 population. The
conditional independence assumption (CIA) implies that for individuals with the same
value of X, the potential outcomes are on average identical in the D = 1 and D = 0
population. It follows that
= E[Y jD = 1] ¡
Z
E[Y
0jX = x;D = 0] ¢ dFXjD=1
= E[Y jD = 1] ¡
Z
E[Y jX = x;D = 0] ¢ dFXjD=1:
We thus have identi¯ed the ATET by transforming the unobserved potential outcome
into an expression that depends on the distribution of observed random variables.
Let m0(x) = E[Y jX = x;D = 0] denote the conditional expectation function of x in the
D = 0 population. Then, the ATET can be expressed as:
E[Y
1 ¡ Y
0jD = 1] = E[Y jD = 1] ¡
Z
m0(x) ¢ dFXjD=1:
Hence, we can estimate the ATET as the average of Y ¡m0(x) in the D = 1 population:





(yi ¡ b m0(xi)):
where b m0(xi) is a non-parametric estimate of m0(xi). As we search for each individual
in D = 1 population for the nearest neighbours in the D = 0 population, this is usually
referred to as \matching" estimator, since it matches observations from one subsample
to another. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that instead of matching on the
high-dimensional vector X, consistent estimates are also obtained by matching on the one-
dimensional propensity score p(x) = Pr(D = 1jX = x). The small sample properties of
20matching estimators have been well explored and appeared to be quite robust in di®erent
practical applications (Larsson, 2003; Ger¯n, Lechner, and Steiger, 2005). Moreover, it
was subjected to Monte Carlo studies investigating small sample problems and sensitivity
issues (Lechner, 2002; FrÄ olich, 2004).
In this paper we use an extension of conventional matching estimation as introduced by
Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006). It extends the ¯rst-nearest neighbour propensity
score matching estimator in several directions. First, matching does not only proceed
with respect to the propensity score p(x), but also incorporates additionally some other
covariates e X that are suspected to be potentially highly correlated with the outcome
variable Y 0 as well as with D. These so called balancing scores can help to ensure that a
misspeci¯cation of the functional form of the propensity score has only a minor impact on
the estimation of ATET. In this application we use age and gender as balancing scores.
As a second extension, we use radius matching instead of ¯rst-nearest neighbour matching.
While ¯rst nearest neighbour matching uses only the ¯rst nearest control observation for
each treated, we use all neighbours within a pre-speci¯ed radius. When there are other
comparison observations that are similar to the matched comparison observation, there
are straightforward e±ciency gains by considering these additional very close neighbours
without paying a high price in terms of additional bias. To increase e±ciency, we form





yj ¢ Kh(k xj ¡ x kM)
X
j:Dj=0
Kh(k xj ¡ x kM)
;
where Kh refers to a kernel function and k xj¡x km to the Mahalonobis distance between
xj and x. Since we match on the propensity score p(x) and the balancing scores e x we de¯ne
this distance as follows. Let (pj;e x0
j)0 be the column vector of the estimated propensity
score b p(xj) and e xj of individual j. Let ­ be the empirical covariance matrix of (pj;e x0
j)0
21in the D = 0 subsample. We de¯ne the Mahalanobis distance with respect to (pj;e x0
j)0 as:
k xj ¡ x kM= [(pj ¡ p(x);(e xj ¡ e x)
0)] ¢ ­
¡1 ¢ [(pj ¡ p(x);(e xj ¡ e x)
0)]
0:
Through the covariance matrix ­, Mahalanobis distance is a weighted distance metric
which takes the di®erent covariances of its components into account. It gives less weight
to variables with a higher variance. To ensure that the propensity score is not domi-
nated by the additional variables, we modify the Mahalanobis distance by multiplying
the weight implicitly assigned to the propensity score by ¯ve, as suggested in Lechner,
Miquel, and Wunsch (2006).
The kernel function now gives di®erent weights to observations that are close to x in terms
of Mahalanobis distance. All D = 0 observations within a radius h around x receive a
positive weight in b m0(x), whereas all other observations are ignored. Of course, there are
many ways to determine the radius h in practice. We suggest being more cautious with
respect to additional bias than with respect to additional variance because the variance
of the estimator is visible after the estimation, whereas the bias generally is not. To be
conservative, we only consider observations that have a distance to their treated obser-
vation of no more than 90% (denoted by R in the following) of the worst match that
we had obtained by one-to-one matching after enforcing common support (R = 0 is the
case of one-to-one matching). To be even more conservative, we weigh the observations
proportionally to their distance from the treated (corresponding to a triangular kernel).
As a third extension, the matching quality is increased by implementing a weighted regres-
sion based bias removal procedure on top of matching. Appropriately weighted regressions
that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness prop-
erty. This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if the matching step is
based on a correctly speci¯ed selection model or the regression model is correctly speci¯ed
(Rubin, 1979; Jo®e, Have, Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should
increase precision and may reduce small sample as well as asymptotic bias of matching
estimators and thus increase robustness of the estimator in this dimension as well. Note
that Abadie and Imbens (2006) have shown that the usual 1-to-K matching estimators,
22where K is a ¯xed number, may exhibit an asymptotic bias, because matches are not
exact. Our weighted radius matching estimator does not necessarily imply a ¯xed K and
is thus probably less subject to this problem. Nevertheless, we follow their proposal and
implement a weighted regression based bias removal procedure on top of the matching.
The regression is done in the comparison sample only. Outcomes are predicted for the
attributes observed in treated and control samples. Speci¯cally, the outcome variable is
regressed on the propensity score and the additional variables with weights coming from
the matching step (Imbens, 2004). The di®erence between the mean of the predicted
outcomes using the observed X of the treated and the weighted X of the comparison
observations gives an estimate of the bias. Without the theoretical justi¯cation given by
Abadie and Imbens (2006), a somewhat similar procedure has been used by Rubin (1979)
and Lechner (2000).
The di®erent steps of the estimator are described in Table A.6 in the Appendix. In the
¯rst step, a probit model is used to estimate the propensity score. Step 2 ensures that
we estimate only e®ects in the region of common support. In the third step, the counter-
factual outcome is estimated. Standard errors are calculated conditional on the weights
for the comparison observation. As retirement decision of couples is likely to be not in-
dependent of each other, standard errors are clustered at the household level. Table A.7
describes the calculation of the variance.
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of retirement
In this section we present our estimation results for the determinants of retirement, be-
fore turning to the estimated e®ects of retirement on health in the next section. They are
interesting for two reasons. First, they are a key factor on which our treatment e®ects
are estimated. Hence, we will discuss the criteria we used when specifying our propensity
score model. Second, they give policymakers insights on factors that a®ect retirement
decisions of employed individuals over 50.
23We have identi¯ed confounding variables by our theoretical considerations in Section 4.2
and found them to be present in our data as illustrated by the descriptives statistics in
Section 3.2. When specifying the propensity score, we seek to ¯nd a speci¯cation which is
comprehensive enough to control for them. We do so by taking into account all (and even
more) variables from Table A.2. But we also seek to ¯nd a parsimonious speci¯cation
given our sample size. Score tests for omitted variables help us to eliminate variables
without additional explanatory power given a set of regressors. For instance, we do not
include the number of employees working for the same employer in our preferred spec-
i¯cation as it does not explain the retirement decision once one controls for other job
characteristics. Some of the health variables, however, remain in our ¯nal model even
when they are farther away from conventional signi¯cance levels, as we consider them to
be important confounders. We also aim to ¯nd the best functional forms for our variables,
e.g. age. We check for heteroskedasticity and for normality. Finally, we seek to ¯nd a
speci¯cation which provides a good match quality, i.e. which balances characteristics in
the subsamples of employed and retired individuals (see Section 7.4 in the Appendix).
Table 2 shows Probit estimates for the likelihood of retiring at wave 2. As couples' de-
cision to retire is most likely not independent of each other, we report clustered standard
errors. Older individuals are more likely to retire with a slightly decreasing likelihood after
having reached a certain age. Individuals with children in their household are less likely
to retire. Educational variables do not signi¯cantly explain the retirement decision when
other socio-economic variables are included. The longer individuals have worked in their
current jobs, the higher is their probability of retiring. Individuals who are less attached
to the labour market, as expressed by having a non-permanent job or working for fewer
hours per week, are more likely to retire. Individuals living in London or in relatively
more deprived areas are also more likely to retire. Pension and ¯nancial variables play a
dominant role in explaining the retirement decision. Having a higher total pension wealth
and having a DB scheme increases the likelihood of retiring, while having a de¯ned DC
scheme reduces it. Initial health variables explain retirement decisions only to a minor
extent. One exemption is having experienced a severe cardiovascular related disease at
24Table 2: Probit estimates for retirement at wave 2
coe±cient t-stat
constant -41.41 5.50 ***
female 0.20 1.28
age in year 2002 1.17 4.67 ***
squared age in year 2002 -0.01 3.87 ***
child lives in household -0.25 1.91 *
country of birth outside the UK -0.31 1.07
degree -0.27 1.42
number of years worked in current job 0.01 2.74 ***
current job is permanent -0.25 1.17
1-30 hours work per week 0.44 2.90 ***
London 0.33 1.75 *
fourth quintile index of multiple deprivation 0.42 2.87 ***
¯fth quintile (most deprived) index of multiple deprivation -0.15 0.78
state pension age reached at wave 2 interview 0.42 1.26
has been o®ered early retirement incentives and did not take it -0.24 1.07
has a de¯ned bene¯t pension scheme 0.33 2.10 **
has a de¯ned contribution pension scheme -0.26 1.77 *
total pension wealth/10000 0.01 3.25 ***
fair or poor self-assessed health 0.21 1.18
has limiting long-standing illness 0.23 1.32
has diabetes and/or hypertension -0.17 1.27
has angina, heart attack or stroke 0.67 2.73 ***
has diagnosed arthritis or osteoporosis 0.14 1.04
has diagnosed cancer 0.16 0.67
health shock in any condition before retirement -0.08 0.35
number of conditions of long-standing illnesses at HSE 0.13 1.67 *
hypertensive blood pressure at HSE -0.24 1.77 *
current smoker -0.09 0.57
drinks over limit 0.16 1.21
never engages either in moderate or vigorous activity -0.08 0.33
likelihood of working -1.33 8.09 ***
missing likelihood of working -1.32 3.70 ***
likelihood that health limits ability to work 0.15 0.73
missing likelihood that health limits work ability -0.42 1.16
Note: ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at household
level. Estimates are based on 1439 observations. Out of them 192 individuals retire at wave 2. Log-
likelihood is -330, Efron (1978) R2 is 0.38.
the ¯rst ELSA interview, which raises retirement probability. The likelihood of retiring
also increases with the number of health conditions which were already present at the
time of the HSE interview. It is smaller for individuals with hypertensive blood pressure
as measured by the nurse at the HSE interview. The latter coe±cients, however, are
25only signi¯cant at the 10% level. Health-related behaviour does not signi¯cantly explain
retirement. Anticipation about work, however, is an important predictor. Individuals
who expect to have a higher chance of remaining in work are less likely to retire. Having
missing expectations about future work reduces the retirement likelihood. Expectations
about experiencing a work limiting health shock are not signi¯cant. With an Efron's R2
of 0.38, the overall explanatory power of the regressors is relatively high. This suggests
that retirement is highly selective and that we need to carefully control for the selection
mechanism. Section 7.4 in the Appendix provides a further discussion on this issue.
With respect to policy implications, Probit estimates suggest that individuals' decisions
to retire might be a®ected to some extent by institutional changes. In our speci¯cation,
the state pension age does not signi¯cantly a®ect retirement, but its sign points in the
right direction. Policymakers who aim to increase retirement age might also do so by
promoting pension schemes with appropriate incentives. To some degree, retirement can
be postponed by improving health of employees, in particular with respect to cardiovas-
cular diseases. We note, though, that we cannot fully assess potential gains of investing
in health, since the sample under consideration has been employed and hence had at least
an initial health state that enabled to be in work.
5.2 Health e®ects of retirement
The estimated ATET are presented in Table 3. The ¯rst column shows the estimated
e®ects for the whole sample, while the other columns show results for subsamples. Results
are obtained by applying the matching estimator as described in Section 4.3. We match
on the propensity score as estimated in Table 2 and on gender, age, and squared age.8
Retirement signi¯cantly increases the risk of being diagnosed any new chronic disease
(either angina, heart attack, diabetes, stroke, arthritis, cancer or psychiatric problem) by
9 percentage points. It raises the likelihood of being diagnosed with a severe cardiovascular
related disease by 3 percentage points. It also raises the risk for other somatic, but non-
8We slightly modulate the propensity score and the balancing scores in the subsamples.
26cardiovascular related diseases (cancer or arthritis) by 8 percentage points. When looking
at the speci¯c conditions separately, we ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects for having a stroke or
a cancer diagnosis. The other e®ects are not signi¯cant, but the signs never become
negative.
Table 3: Estimated average treatment e®ects on the treated
sample gender social class age
female male low high 50-59 60-69
any chronic condition 0.09** 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.11* 0.03 0.16**
(2.06) (1.49) (0.77) (0.23) (1.87) (0.54) (2.48)
angina, heart attack, or stroke 0.03* 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04
(1.66) (1.10) (1.05) (0.90) (1.15) (0.37) (1.45)
arthritis, or cancer 0.08** 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.11** 0.03 0.13**
(1.96) (1.49) (0.33) (-0.43) (2.16) (0.55) (2.51)
angina 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 .
(0.56) (-0.27) (0.19) (0.48) (0.78) (0.78)
heart attack 0.01 0.01 0.02 . 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.80) (1.00) (1.27) (1.23) (0.40) (0.38)
stroke 0.02* 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 . 0.04*
(1.87) (1.00) (1.50) (1.62) (0.82) (1.83)
diabetes 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04*
(0.85) (0.83) (0.38) (1.28) (-0.17) (0.76) (1.82)
arthritis 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.09* 0.01 0.10*
(1.36) (0.70) (0.19) (-1.31) (1.84) (0.17) (1.81)
cancer 0.03* 0.04* 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
(1.81) (1.66) (0.73) (1.21) (1.49) (1.13) (1.58)
psychiatric 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02
(0.34) (-0.44) (0.91) (-0.28) (0.96) (0.31) (-0.62)
number of treated 192 103 89 90 102 94 93
common support 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.91
Note: T-stats in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are
clustered at household level. Last row shows percentage remaining after common support.
Some of these conditions, e.g. heart attack or stroke, rapidly develop, others such as
cancer grow over longer periods. In any case, retirement might be only one among other
risk factors. However, we can only estimate the e®ects of retirement on diagnosis, but
not on onset of the disease. It seems to be likely that diagnosis and onset coincide for
conditions with a rapid onset. However, for the other conditions it is not clear, whether
the risk of the actual condition or whether the likelihood of diagnosis has increased due to
27retirement. It could just be the case that individuals have more time to see their physician
after retirement. However, policy implications would be di®erent then, as early diagnosis
might help to more e®ectively treat the disease, so that retirement would actually be ben-
e¯cial for health in the long run. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between
both possible explanations. But we keep in mind that visiting a physician is likely to
be induced by some complaints and not only by time availability and that other studies
have found a positive association between retirement and cancer mortality that cannot
be explained by time availability (Morris, Cook, and Shaper, 1994; Bamia, Trichopoulou,
and Trichopoulos, 2007).
We performed a profound robustness analysis, which is described in Section 7.5 in the
Appendix. We found the results for our main population to be quite stable.
In order to analyse e®ect heterogeneity, we split the sample into further subsamples.
However, as the sample size becomes smaller, ¯nding statistical signi¯cant e®ects is less
likely. Furthermore, e®ects become less robust. Despite this, we decided to report them
as they illustrate that retirement is likely to have diverse e®ects for di®erent individuals.
We compare the levels of the ATETs, as they might be informative for detecting tenden-
cies among the di®erent subgroups. However, we are cautious with our interpretation as
con¯dence intervals are wide. Compared to the overall sample, we ¯nd that females have
a higher risk of being diagnosed with cancer and a lower risk of developing cardiovascu-
lar diseases. For male retirees, estimated e®ects are higher for heart attack, stroke and
psychiatric problems, but smaller for arthritis and cancer. We report ATETs for di®erent
socio-economic classes, since the presence of health inequalities has been well established
in the literature. We observe that individuals from a low social class are more likely to
experience a stroke or to have a cancer diagnosis, but less likely to have arthritis. This
might indicate that retirement has mixed health e®ects for them. In contrast, retirement
clearly worsens the health for individuals with a higher socio-economic background. We
report treatment e®ects for di®erent ages of retirement, since it is controversial whether
earlier or later retirement is associated with mortality (Tsai, Wendt, Donnelly, de Jong,
28and Ahmed, 2005). We ¯nd that retirement raises the likelihood for being diagnosed with
a condition for individuals who were between 50 to 59 years old in 2002. However, adverse
health e®ects are much higher for individuals who were older when they retired.
All these estimates do not take a potential bias due to health-related attrition into ac-
count. Table A.4 shows that drop-outs have di®erent characteristics than our sample. In
particular, they di®er with respect to their socio-economic status. Thus, it might be legit-
imate to assume that retirement a®ects drop-outs in a similar way as individuals in lower
socio-economic classes. Under this assumption, e®ects are likely to be underestimated for
all conditions with the exception of arthritis.
5.3 Additional results
In this section, we discuss further supporting evidence. ELSA additionally provides infor-
mation on risk factors that are related to some of the chronic conditions for which e®ects
of retirement have been estimated. These risk factors are measured for all individuals who
participated in the nurse interview at wave 2. They complement the health outcomes con-
sidered above, as they re°ect the health states of individuals, irrespective of whether a
diagnosis has been made. However, we cannot observe whether these risk factors were
already high before retirement. Thus, reverse causation cannot be fully ruled out. Still we
can control for the other confounding variables. When adjusting the risk factors for the
same confounding variables as above, we ¯nd that retirees have signi¯cantly higher LDL
cholesterol and ¯brinogen levels (see Table A.8), which are risk factors for cardiovascular
diseases. However, the interpretation of these results is not straightforward, as will be
discussed in Section 7.6 in the Appendix. Still, they can be judged as further support
for our ¯ndings: retirees appear to have worse health than employed individuals after
adjusting for confounding variables.
We also check the robustness of our results with respect to our sample choice. The ¯rst
column in Table A.9 in the Appendix shows estimates when we only use information from
the ¯rst two waves, but discard any information from wave 3. This speci¯cation reduces
the scope of attrition. But it only allows us to observe health outcomes in the short-run.
29Furthermore, retirement and employment are less strictly de¯ned. We ¯nd that the ad-
verse e®ects of retirement are usually smaller. One exception are the e®ects for severe
cardiovascular diseases, which are 1 percentage point higher.
Finally, we estimate the short-run health e®ects of retirement by looking at new health
conditions that have been diagnosed within the ¯rst year after retirement. Table A.9
illustrates that the adverse health e®ects of retirement are smaller, but still considerable.
They also indicate that - while most of the adverse health e®ects accumulate within the
¯rst year after retirement - retirement continues to have a detrimental e®ect on health
even in the medium-term.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the e®ects of retirement on di®erent health outcomes. Data
stem from the ¯rst three waves of ELSA and allow us to control for potential confounders.
Estimates are obtained by non-parametric matching estimators. Reverse causality is ruled
out by exploiting the timing of retirement and of a new diagnosis. Health-related attrition
might still be present in the estimates, but is most likely to bias estimates towards zero.
First, we provide estimates on the determinants of retirement. We ¯nd that employees
propensity to retire is largely a®ected by their age, job characteristics and anticipations
to stay in work. Our results also indicate that policymakers can a®ect the retirement
decision by promoting certain pension schemes or employees' health.
Then, we provide estimates on the health e®ects of retirement for the retirees. We ¯nd that
retirement increases the risk of being diagnosed with a chronic condition. In particular,
it raises the risk of severe cardiovascular diseases such as heart attacks, strokes or angina.
We also ¯nd that it increases the risk of being diagnosed with cancer, but we cannot
disentangle whether the likelihood of diagnosis or the actual incidence has increased. We
do not ¯nd any signi¯cant e®ects for diagnosis of psychiatric problems, but are aware
that psychiatric conditions often remain undiagnosed. These results are fairly robust
with regard to di®erent speci¯cations. They are also re°ected by risk factors which have
been measured by nurses.
30Under the assumption that onset and diagnosis of a disease rather coincide, our ¯ndings
suggest that, on average, retirement has detrimental health e®ects. Furthermore, there
is evidence for a substantial e®ect heterogeneity: retirement does not harm every retiree,
and - if it does - it provokes di®erent conditions. Thus, we do not expect that there is a
single optimal retirement age that minimises health risks for everyone.
Our ¯ndings are in contrast to studies that employ instruments to address the endogeneity
of retirement. One explanation for this might be that the subpopulation for which the
instrument induced retirement experiences di®erent health e®ects than retirees on average.
Our results raise further questions as to whether the adverse health e®ects of retirement
can be avoided. For this purpose it is crucial to understand through which mechanisms
adverse health e®ects are transmitted. Once larger sample sizes are available, analysing
e®ect heterogeneity in more detail might give us more insights.
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7.1 Further details on data and sample
Data stems from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA has been
designed to be representative for people born before 29th February 1952, living in private
households in England. It was drawn from households that had previously responded to
the Health Survey for England (HSE) in 1998, 1999, or 2001. So in addition to the ELSA
interviews, information on the ELSA members is available from the HSE. ELSA contains
very detailed information on employment, earnings, wealth, pensions, expectations about
future health and paid work, and other household and individual demographics. It consists
of personal face-to-face computer assisted interviews, self-completion questionnaires and
nurse visits. Wave 1 ¯eldwork was conducted in 2002-2003, wave 2 in 2004-2005 and wave
3 in 2006-2007.
At wave 1, 11392 individuals were interviewed. Only individuals who were not interviewed
by a proxy are retained, since proxy interviews are an indication of a serious mental
or physical impairment which prevented the respondent from a face-to-face interview.
As a second selection criterion, only the 2906 individuals who were employed at the
¯rst wave are kept. An individual is considered to be employed if he responds that (i)
being \employed" describes his current situation best and (ii) \paid work" was one of his
activities in the last month.9 We deliberately discard self-employed individuals, since they
are likely to have more leeway in deciding on retirement and thus selection into retirement
might be di®erent.
At wave 2, around 18% of the employed individuals are lost due to attrition.10 We observe
1803 individuals who remain employed. 268 individuals are newly retired. We consider
an individual as retired if she responds that (i) \retired" describes her current situation
best and (ii) \not in paid work" was her activity in the last month.11
At the third wave, we lose 15% of the individuals who were either retired or employed
at wave 2 due to non-response. Out of the individuals who have been employed at the
two prior waves, 1247 individuals are still employed at the third wave. Based on these
individuals, we will estimate counterfactual health outcomes that we would observe in
the absence of retirement. Out of the individuals who retired at wave 2, 192 are still
retired at wave 3. For these individuals, we will analyse the health e®ects in most of our
speci¯cations. Thus, our main sample consists of the 1439 individuals who are either still
employed or still retired at wave 3. This sample allows us to analyse health outcomes not
only in the short, but also in the medium term. In addition, we will analyse e®ects of
9While 99% of employed individuals are also in paid work, only 86% of individuals in paid work also
describe their current situation as being employed. By imposing both criteria, we discard individuals
in paid work who describe their current situation as retired (6%), self-employed (4%), looking after
home or family (2%), being semi-retired (1%), being unemployed or being disabled. As a consequence,
selected individuals should be more likely to be working at the ¯rst wave.
10See Section 3.3
11All retired individuals were not in paid work, while individuals who were not in paid work have also
described themselves as unemployed (7%), disabled (9%), looking after home or family (10%), being
semi-retired (1%)), besides being retired (71%). Thus, by imposing both criteria, we are more likely
to estimate the e®ect of economic inactivity due to regular retirement. We focus on regular in contrast
to partial retirement, because potential health e®ects are more likely to occur if individuals experience
a more drastic change in their lifestyle.
32retirement when only considering the ¯rst two (instead of the ¯rst three waves).
Table A.1: Sample selection
Number of individuals
deleted remaining
wave 1 interview (individuals older than 50 in 2002) 11392
not interviewed by a proxy -158 11234
employed at wave 1 -8328 2906
. ............................................................................ .
no attrition at wave 2 -537 2369
employed at wave 2 1803
retired at wave 2 268
sample at wave 2 2071
. ............................................................................ .
no attrition at wave 3 -302 1769
employed at wave 1 to wave 3 1247
retired at wave 2 and wave 3 192
sample at wave 3 1439
Table A.2: Means of selected variables for employed and retired individuals
Test for Mean
Means Di®erences





age in year 2002 55.07 60.20 *** .
between 50-54 years old in 2002 0.51 0.05 *** .
between 55-59 years old in 2002 0.38 0.44 .
between 60-64 years old in 2002 0.09 0.40 *** .
older than 64 in 2002 0.02 0.11 *** .
married or cohabiting 0.82 0.79
number of individuals living in household 2.54 2.11 *** **
child lives in household 0.44 0.22 *** **
no children 0.10 0.11
has grandchildren 0.36 0.56 ***
country of birth outside the UK 0.05 0.05




Employed Retired not ad- age ad-
justed justed
Education
degree 0.19 0.11 ***
higher education below degree 0.16 0.15
A levels 0.10 0.08
O levels 0.22 0.24
other grade equivalent 0.03 0.06
no quali¯cation 0.21 0.29 **
Socio-economic classi¯cation
professional 0.05 0.05
managerial and technical 0.34 0.29
skilled manual 0.24 0.25
skilled non-manual 0.18 0.20
semi-skilled 0.14 0.13 *
unskilled 0.04 0.06
Job characteristics
number of years worked in current job 11.25 14.67 *** ***
current job is permanent 0.95 0.91 *
1-30 hours work per week at current job 0.25 0.43 *** **
Number of employees working for the same employer in the UK
1-4 employees 0.04 0.05
5-19 employees 0.10 0.10
20-99 employees 0.15 0.10 ** ***
100-499 employees 0.12 0.10
500-999 employees 0.07 0.05
1000 and more employees 0.51 0.58 * **
Physical activity at work
sedentary occupation 0.42 0.40
standing occupation 0.32 0.34
physical work 0.22 0.24
heavy manual work 0.04 0.03
Regional characteristics
Government o±ce region
North East 0.06 0.06
North West 0.11 0.13
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.11 0.11
East Midlands 0.12 0.10
West Midlands 0.10 0.09
East of England 0.12 0.11
London 0.09 0.15 *
South East 0.17 0.16
South West 0.11 0.08




Employed Retired not ad- age ad-
justed justed
Population density of postcode sector
¯rst quintile (least dense) 0.14 0.10
second quintile 0.23 0.22
third quintile 0.23 0.26
fourth quintile 0.23 0.22 *
¯fth quintile 0.16 0.19
Index of multiple deprivation
¯rst quintile (least deprived) 0.21 0.18
second quintile 0.17 0.19
third quintile 0.21 0.15 **
fourth quintile 0.21 0.23
¯fth quintile 0.19 0.25 *
Pension characteristics and ¯nancial variables
state pension age reached at wave 2 interview date 0.06 0.34 ***
has been o®ered early retirement incentives 0.04 0.09 ***
has de¯ned bene¯t pension scheme 0.39 0.46 * ***
has de¯ned contribution pension scheme 0.35 0.19 *** ***
has any private pension scheme 0.74 0.57 **
has public sector pension scheme 0.25 0.22
total pension wealth in 2002 185541 221342 ** ***
private pension wealth in 2002 127768 158393 ** **
state pension wealth in 2002 57773 62949 * *
net (non-pension) total wealth 208845 207568
employment income per week 414 337 ***
Health characteristics
Cognitive function
no full score on date question 0.13 0.18
number of words that could be recalled 6.23 5.92 **
Number of di±culties in activities of daily living
due to physical problems 0.70 1.02 *** *
due to mental and physical problems 0.13 0.20
Self-assessed health
poor 0.01 0.01
fair 0.09 0.18 *** **
good 0.31 0.31
very good 0.39 0.34
excellent 0.19 0.16




Employed Retired not ad- age ad-
justed justed
Diagnosed conditions at wave 1
high blood pressure 0.27 0.29
angina 0.02 0.05 **
heart attack 0.01 0.03
congestive heart failure 0.00 0.00
heart murmur 0.03 0.05
abnormal heart rhythm 0.03 0.05
diabetes 0.03 0.06
stroke 0.01 0.02
chronic lung disease 0.02 0.03
asthma 0.09 0.10
arthritis 0.19 0.27 **
osteoporosis 0.01 0.05 ** *
cancer 0.03 0.06 *
psychiatric problem 0.07 0.05
Symptomatic conditions at wave 1
heart attack (Rose questionnaire) 0.06 0.09
angina (Rose questionnaire) 0.00 0.00
depression (CES depression scale) 0.09 0.08
bad general health (GHQ12) 0.10 0.08
Conditions at HSE interview
number of conditions 0.53 0.73 *** **
hypertensive blood pressure 0.26 0.24
body-mass index 25.53 24.84
takes medication 0.36 0.36
takes vitamins, minerals 0.31 0.28 **
Health habits
Amount of vigorous physical activity (cycling, jogging, etc.)
more than once a week 0.27 0.19 **
once a week 0.14 0.15
once to three times a month 0.12 0.08 *
hardly ever or never 0.48 0.58 ***
Smoking and drinking
current smoker 0.20 0.18
ex-smoker 0.40 0.39
no alcohol units per week 0.05 0.05
under 1 alcohol units per week 0.10 0.11
1-7 alcohol units per week 0.32 0.25 **
7-10 alcohol units per week 0.11 0.10
10-21 alcohol units per week 0.21 0.23
21-38 alcohol units per week 0.11 0.16
more than 38 alcohol units per week 0.09 0.06
has private health insurance 0.23 0.22




Employed Retired not ad- age ad-
justed justed
Expectations about health and work
likelihood of being alive 0.65 0.66
missing likelihood of being alive 0.01 0.01
likelihood of working 0.68 0.28 *** ***
missing likelihood of working 0.06 0.26 ***
likelihood that health limits ability to work 0.38 0.31 ***
missing likelihood that health limits work ability 0.04 0.10 ***
Feed forward problems at wave 1 and missing HSE interview
was not asked to con¯rm cvd condition at wave 2 0.17 0.19
wrong information was fed forward 0.00 0.01
HSE interview missing 0.01 0.03 *
Note: ***,**,* denote that means are signi¯cantly di®erent at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are
clustered at household level. Third column uses standard t-test for mean di®erences. Fourth column tests
for mean di®erences in age adjusted variables, where variables are balanced on age, age squared and four age
dummies.
7.2 Further details on attrition
7.2.1 Reason for non-response at wave 2
Table A.3: Reason for non-response at wave 2, sample drop-outs
Frequency Percent
Ill at home during survey period 12 2.2
Away/in hospital during survey period 6 1.1
Physically or mentally incompetent 1 0.2
Died 6 1.1
Not issued 44 8.2
No contact 21 3.9
Refusal before interview 266 49.5
Refusal during interview 8 1.5
Broken appointment 23 4.3
O±ce refusal 56 10.4
Language di±culties 1 0.2
Other unproductive 15 2.8
Untraced 60 11.2
Moved { out of Britain 18 3.4
Total 537 100.0
377.2.2 Probability of non-response at wave 2 and wave 3
Table A.4: Probit estimates for response rate at wave 2 and wave 3, sample: individuals who
are employed at wave 1
in wave 2 in wave 3
Observations 2906 2906
Percentage with response 0.82 0.72
Log-likelihood -1297 -1607
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.06
female 0.04 0.09*
(0.74) (1.88)




child lives in household 0.16** 0.18***
(2.34) (2.79)




higher education below degree 0.34*** 0.46***
(3.76) (5.37)
A levels 0.42*** 0.40***
(3.55) (3.93)
O levels 0.03 0.23***
(0.41) (3.14)
total income per week/1000 0.13 0.08
(1.29) (0.92)




physical work -0.17** -0.14**
(2.51) (2.19)
heavy manual work -0.05 -0.13
(0.33) (1.04)
East Midlands 0.26** 0.19*
(2.31) (1.91)
South East -0.14 -0.09
(1.61) (1.12)
most deprived area (¯fth quintile) -0.14 -0.33***
(1.50) (3.72)
Continued on next page
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in wave 2 in wave 3
has any long-standing illness -0.05 -0.10
(0.73) (1.61)
fair or poor self-assessed health 0.14 -0.09
(1.15) (0.79)
good self-assessed health 0.08 -0.13
(0.86) (1.57)
very good self-assessed health 0.04 -0.10
(0.46) (1.33)
bad mental health (GHQ12) 0.25** 0.19**
(2.36) (2.06)
diagnosed angina 0.35* 0.14
(1.87) (0.91)
diagnosed diabetes -0.26* -0.12
(1.84) (0.91)
diagnosed arthritis 0.16** 0.08
(2.04) (1.14)
diagnosed psychiatric problem 0.28** 0.15
(2.00) (1.32)
chances that health limits ability to work -0.25** 0.02
(2.36) (0.24)
missing chances that health limits work ability -0.29** -0.15
(2.21) (1.21)
missing whether current smoker 0.05 -0.00
(0.88) (0.08)
never engaging either in moderate or vigorous activity -0.16 -0.13
(1.46) (1.23)
1998 HSE source year -0.20*** -0.27***
(2.61) (3.76)
1999 HSE year 0.40** 0.07
(2.25) (0.42)
HSE interview missing -0.91*** -1.00***
(5.22) (5.77)
not all household members interviewed at HSE -0.28*** -0.27***
(2.96) (3.08)
interview date wave 1 -0.06*** -0.05***
(3.82) (3.07)
has not fully completed sc booklet at HSE 0.09 0.20
(0.37) (0.86)
did not agree to nurse visit at individual HSE -0.28 -0.29
(1.36) (1.45)




Note: T-stats in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are
clustered at household level.
397.2.3 Di®erences between two and three waves balanced sample
One problem we face in our analysis is the substantial attrition rate, as has been illustrated
by Table A.1. Attrition does not only reduce the sample size and hence aggravates
statistical inference, but is also a potential threat for the consistency of our estimates:
if attrition is not at random, but related to health and retirement, estimates might be
biased.
In principal, one could narrow the degree of attrition by using a balanced sample of two
instead of three waves. This might result in a sample with di®erent characteristics because
of potentially systematic non-response patterns. Characteristics might also di®er because
groups would be less strictly de¯ned when using only two waves. For instance, individuals
who retired at wave 2, but switched back to work at wave 3 would be considered to be
retired, while they would not be when using three waves.
To assess this issue, we estimate a probit where the dependent variable is whether an
individual who was employed (retired) at wave 2 is still employed (retired) at wave 3.
Thus, the dependent variable takes the value zero if the individual is lost due to non-
response at wave 3 or due to switching to another state. As explanatory variables we
can now use health variables from wave 2, since this sample is conditional on having
responded at wave 2. Table A.5 below indicates that observed health variables at wave
2 do not contribute much to explain whether individuals still belong to the same group
at wave 3. For employed individuals, the only signi¯cant health variable is the diagnosis
of an arthritis, which is only signi¯cant at the 10% level. For retired individuals, a worse
health state (measured by not good self-assessed health, diagnosed angina and a high
C-reactive protein) reduces the likelihood of responding to be retired at wave 3. However,
we note that most of the coe±cients are small and insigni¯cant. In particular, our health
outcomes of interest as diagnosed at wave 2 do not add much explanatory power.
As argued before, this does not rule out that there is health-related attrition at wave 3,
but only suggests that attrition is not strongly related to observed health variables at wave
2. Still, we would expect that attrition with regard to our outcomes of interest should be
correlated with the same variables as diagnosed one wave before. Thus, it seems to be
highly unlikely that health-related attrition at wave 3 results in systematically di®erent
estimation results as compared to using only two waves. On the other hand, using three
waves allows observations of health outcomes for a longer time horizon. For these reasons,
we opt to use three waves in our main speci¯cation. However, we keep in mind that health-
related attrition might be present in our sample. We would expect, though, that most of
the health-related attrition has accrued before wave 2, while at wave 3 there seems to be
less scope for it.
40Table A.5: Probit estimates for probability of belonging to the same group at wave 3 as in wave
2
sample employed at wave 2 retired at wave 2
Observations 1803 268
Percentage with (same) response 0.69 0.72
Log-likelihood -1053 -142





age in year 2002 -0.05*** -0.01
(5.58) (0.63)
limiting long-standing illness at wave 2 -0.06 0.08
(0.68) (0.33)
good self-assessed health at wave 2 0.15 0.82***
(1.36) (2.93)
very good self-assessed health at wave 2 0.12 0.34
(1.07) (1.20)
excellent self-assessed health at wave 2 0.12 0.60*
(0.91) (1.77)
missing nurse interview at wave 2 -0.62*** -0.17
(5.17) (0.49)
hypertensive blood pressure at wave 2 -0.08 0.25
(1.07) (1.11)
high total cholesterol (more than 5 mmol/l) at wave 2 0.10 0.17
(1.34) (0.81)
high waist hip ratio at wave 2 -0.05 0.09
(0.74) (0.48)
high c-reactive protein (more than 3 mg/l) at wave 2 -0.11 -0.43**
(1.36) (2.03)
Health outcomes after assigned/actual retirement at wave 2
newly diagnosed angina -0.30 -1.50*
(0.47) (1.80)




newly diagnosed arthritis -0.35* 1.02
(1.87) (1.59)
newly diagnosed cancer -0.14
(0.32)
newly psychiatric problem -0.05
(0.15)
Note: T-stats in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are clustered
at household level. We also control for marriage, child in household, three educational dummies, employment
income, debts, government o±ce region. Stroke is not included as a regressor in the ¯rst column, as none of
the employed drop-outs had this condition. Cancer and psychiatric problems are not contained as regressors
in the second column, since none of the retired drop-outs had these conditions.
417.3 Further details on the estimator
Table A.6: Implementation of the estimator
step 1 We estimate a probit model to obtain the choice probabilities b pi = Pr(D =
1jX = xi) for every observation.
step 2 We restrict sample to common support. All D = 1 observations with b pi larger
than the largest propensity score among the D = 0 observations are deleted.
step 3 We estimate the counterfactual expectation of the outcome variable E[Y 0jD =
1] for the common support.
step 3a We ¯nd for every observation i of the D = 1 sample the nearest D = 0
observation in terms of the Mahalanobis distance. Mahalanobis distance is
de¯ned with respect to the propensity score and a subset of covariates (b pi; e x0
i)0.
This distance is denoted as ±i for observation i from the D = 1 sample. The
maximum distance among all D = 1 observations is denoted as ±. In other
words, ± is the smallest possible value such that for every D = 1 observation
there is at least one D = 0 observation within a ± neighbourhood with respect
to Mahalanobis distance.
This value ± would be a natural choice for the bandwidth of the kernel. How-
ever, a smaller bandwidth often leads to better ¯nite sample properties (Lech-
ner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2006). In our preferred speci¯cation, we choose
h = 0:9± as the bandwidth value for the kernel. This of course implies that
there are some (at least one) D = 1 observations for which the neighbourhood
as de¯ned by h does not contain any D = 0 observations. In this case, the
bandwidth is extended locally such that exactly one D = 0 observation is
included.
step 3b With the choice of h, we calculate the ATET according to





(yi ¡ b m0(xi));
where b m0 is a kernel estimator as described in Section 4.3.
step 3c As a ¯nal step, we reduce bias through a weighted regression following a rec-
ommendation of Imbens (2004). This procedure takes into account a potential
bias if treated and matched comparison are not exactly identical in values of
X. Then some regression adjustment for di®erences in X can help to re-
duce bias. Let i be an observation from the D = 1 sample and j(i) be the
nearest observation from the D = 0 sample. The estimated counterfactual
outcome for i is thus yj(i) and the mismatch in X is xj(i) ¡ xi. If we assume
that E[Y jX;D = 0] = X0¯0 is linear, the adjusted counterfactual for i is





(yi ¡ yj(i) ¡ (xj(i) ¡ xi)0¯0:
With radius matching, we need to replace yj(i) with the expression for b m0(xi)
and similarly for xj(i).
42Table A.7: Estimation of the variance for clustered data
Using estimators of b m0(xi), it is readily seen that the ATET estimator may be expressed







i:Di=0 wi = 1 and
P
i:Di=1 Ni = 1.
Following Lechner (2001), since the two terms are based on independent subsamples and
treating the weights as given, the variance of the ATET is the sum of the variance of these
two terms. In the following, we focus on the calculation of the variance for the second
term and note that the calculation for the ¯rst is analogous by replacing wi with 1=Ni.





i=1 I(Ci = j)(1 ¡ Di)yiwi where the sums are over all N in-
dividuals and over the J households. The variable Ci 2 1;:::J indicates the household
to which individual i belongs. The indicator function I takes value if the household of
individual i is household j. The number of individuals for household j in the D = 0 and
weighted by wi is thus given by
Nj =
PN
i=1 I(Ci = j)(1 ¡ Di)yiwi. We now compute the variance by allowing that
the outcomes across individuals in the same household are dependent, but assume that























where Aj = 1
Nj
PN
i=1 I(Ci = j)(1 ¡ Di)yiwi. Hence, the variance is obtained by summing





















which we now plug in the previous formula.
437.4 Further details on selectivity of retirement and match quality
The high selectivity of retirement is also illustrated by Figure A.1 below. It shows the
distribution of propensity scores for employed and retired individuals. Most of the individ-
uals who remain employed throughout the three ELSA waves have a very low retirement
probability with a mean of 8%. For retired individuals the support of the propensity score
ranges from 0 to 0.96 with quite considerable probability mass in the middle. Di®erences
in distributions re°ect the di®erences between retired and employed individuals. To apply
propensity score matching, however, the shape of the distribution can be di®erent, as long
as there are comparison individuals with propensity scores similar to retired individuals.
In our case, even very high values of the propensity score are observed in the control
group (its maximum is at 0.91). We delete retired individuals with a propensity score
larger than this maximum from the estimation. This common support restriction turns
out to be not very restrictive: we delete eight observations (around 4% of the retired
individuals).
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Furthermore, we do not use all employed individuals, but only those who are similar to
the retired individuals (as explained in detail in Section 4.3). Thus, most of the employed
individuals with a very low propensity to retire are not included in our estimation, while
those with a higher propensity score are used more often. In our case, estimation is based
on a quite diverse comparison sample: 597 di®erent individuals are used in the estimation
and most of them (569) are used around once as comparison.
In order to assess the match quality, we check whether the marginal distributions of the
covariates X are identical in the treated and the matched weighted comparison subsample.
As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching on the propensity score leads to
a balancing of the covariates X in the D = 1 and D = 0 population. Hence, after matching
treated and control, the joint distribution of X and thereby the marginal distributions
of X should be identical in both matched subsamples. As argued by Imai, King, and
Stuart (2008), traditional hypothesis tests for equality of means such as t-, F-, Chi2- or
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are problematic for evaluating balance. Since our estimation
process also includes some bias adjustment, we prefer to base our balancing test on this
estimation procedure instead of using equality of means tests. More precisely, we treat one
of the covariates X as if it were the outcome variable and estimate the treatment e®ect of
D on this covariate. The treatment e®ect on this covariate must be zero by de¯nition of
the estimator. We thus test whether the estimated treatment e®ect of D on this covariate
44is indeed zero. Since this test has no power for the balancing scores e X, we also follow
Imai, King, and Stuart (2008) and look at the quantile-quantile plots. Tests suggests that
marginal distributions between treated and matched comparison are similar.
7.5 Robustness analysis
We performed a profound robustness analysis to check the sensitivity of our results. First,
we reduce the radius to R = 10. Estimated treatment e®ects hardly change, while vari-
ance increases. The only exception is severe cardiovascular disease: the ATET increases
to 0.04 and is signi¯cant at the 1% level. This is mainly due to an increased risk of having
a heart attack. As the bias should be reduced by a smaller radius due to matching more
similar individuals, we consider our estimates for cardiovascular diseases in Table 3 as
rather conservative.
Second, we use di®erent weights for the balancing scores as compared to the propensity
score. We ¯nd that coe±cients are not much a®ected.
Third, we chose di®erent balancing scores. When adding expectations about work, co-
e±cients and signi¯cance increase. When adding expectations about health shocks or
having experienced a severe cardiovascular disease in the past, treatment e®ects remain
comparable and even rise for cardiovascular diseases. Adding other health variables does
not considerably change treatment e®ects either.
Fourth, we vary the propensity score. We ¯nd that our estimates are not much a®ected
by (i) eliminating insigni¯cant health variables or (ii) adding further health variables such
as limitations in physical activities, memory problems or life expectations.
Fifth, we use age dummies instead of linear and quadratic age terms. This results in a
less binding common support restriction: we lose only one retired individual. Estimated
e®ects slightly decrease compared to our main speci¯cation. In our main speci¯cation,
however, weighted means of age indicators in the control group are more similar to those
of retired.
7.6 Further details on the additional results
Table A.8 provides mean di®erences in risk factors that are related to some of the chronic
conditions for which ATETs have been estimated. They are adjusted for the same con-
founding variables which are used to identify the ATETs, as they have been estimated in
the same way as the ATET. However, they should not be interpreted as causal e®ects,
since reverse causality cannot be ruled out. We only observe risk factors as measured
during the nurse interview, but do not know whether they were already raised before
retirement. Still we report them as they show di®erences in health between retired and
employed individuals which are present irrespective of a diagnosis. Compared to unad-
justed means, adjusted mean di®erences are more informative, since they control for the
confounding variables used to estimate the propensity score. In other words, when ¯nding
signi¯cant di®erences between treated and control groups, it can be ruled out, that these
di®erences are driven by age, gender and so on. Unfortunately, 7% of the individuals in
our sample have not participated at the nurse interview at wave 2; so our results are based
on a smaller sample.
We do not ¯nd any signi¯cant e®ects for all, but two risk factors: retired individuals are
7% more likely to have a high ¯brinogen concentration and 6% more likely to have a high
LDL cholesterol in their blood sample. Fibrinogen is a soluble protein essential to the
45blood clotting mechanism. High ¯brinogen is related to increased risk of cardiovascular
disease (Smith, Patterson, Yarnell, Rumley, Ben-Shlomo, and Lowe, 2005). LDL choles-
terol is a risk factor for cardiovascular disease and intervention studies have shown that a
reduction of LDL cholesterol with statins leads to a reduction in these diseases (Baigent,
Keech, Kearney, Blackwell, Buck, Pollicino, Kirby, Sourjina, Peto, Collins, and Simes,
2005). We also note that retired individuals are more likely to be overweight or obese.
This is not signi¯cant when estimated separately, but becomes signi¯cant when aggre-
gated. While not signi¯cant, other biomarkers such as C-reactive protein, triglycerides
and haemoglobin also suggest that retirees have a higher risk for cardiovascular diseases.
However, it is not straightforward to interpret even signi¯cant di®erences. First, reverse
causality cannot be ruled out. Second, diagnosis of a disease and risk factor need not be
correlated. Suppose an individual was diagnosed with a diabetes, then he would also be
likely to receive some treatment so that his level of glucose is controlled. Correspondingly,
high ¯brinogen might be predictive of cardiovascular diseases, but might fall after having
experienced a cardiovascular shock.
Although the interpretation of di®erences in biomarkers is not straightforward, they sup-
port our estimated treatment e®ects: retirees appear to have a worse health than employed
individuals after adjusting for confounding variables.
Table A.8: Adjusted mean di®erences in risk factors
adjusted t-stat number common
mean di®erence treated support
hypertensive blood pressure 0.01 0.22 161 0.96
high total cholesterol (more than 5 mmol/l) 0.03 1.07 141 0.94
high LDL cholesterol (more than 3 mmol/l) 0.06* 1.69 141 0.94
high triglycerides (more than 1.6 mmol/l) 0.07 0.90 141 0.94
high C-reactive protein (more than 3 mg/l) 0.08 1.21 141 0.94
high ¯brinogen (more than 4.2 g/l) 0.07** 2.12 140 0.94
high glucose (more than 7 mmol/l) 0.01 0.22 101 0.94
low haemoglobin (less than 12g/ dl) 0.03 1.11 138 0.94
overweight (bmi between 25 and 30) 0.07 1.09 170 0.96
obese (bmi higher than 30) 0.05 0.84 170 0.96
Note: ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard errors are clustered at household
level. Last column shows percentage remaining after common support.
We also check the robustness of our results with respect to our sample choice. The
¯rst column in Table A.9 below shows estimates when we only use information from the
¯rst two waves, but discard any information from wave 3. The second column shows our
estimation results from above when we use all three waves. We would expect estimates
in the ¯rst column to be di®erent for three reasons: (i) retirement and employment are
less strictly de¯ned; (ii) there is less attrition; (iii) the health outcomes are observed for a
shorter time horizon. However, we would be concerned if our estimates did fundamentally
change.
We ¯nd that ATETs are usually smaller when using only two waves. However, for devel-
oping a severe cardiovascular disease, in particular a heart attack, e®ects are 1-% point
46Table A.9: ATETs for balanced two wave, three wave sample and in the short-run
sample wave 1 and wave 2 wave 1 to wave 3 wave 1 to wave 3
time horizon cumulate cumulate short-run
any chronic condition 0.06* 0.09** 0.06*
(1.89) (2.06) (1.94)
angina, heart attack, or stroke 0.04** 0.03* 0.02
(2.40) (1.66) (1.05)
arthritis, or cancer 0.04 0.08** 0.04
(1.28) (1.96) (1.45)
angina 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.30) (0.56) (0.55)
heart attack 0.02* 0.01 0.01
(1.76) (0.80) (0.60)
stroke 0.02* 0.02* 0.01
(1.82) (1.87) (1.13)
diabetes 0.01 0.02 0
(0.44) (0.85) (0.45)
arthritis 0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.76) (1.36) (0.68)
cancer 0.02* 0.03* 0.02*
(1.79) (1.81) (1.71)
psychiatric 0.02 0.01 0.01
(1.19) (0.34) (0.56)
Note: T-stats in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5, 10% level. Standard
errors are clustered at household level.
higher. Overall, estimates con¯rm that retirement raises the risk of developing certain
conditions.
Finally, we estimate the short-run health e®ects of retirement. We de¯ne a short-run
health condition to be present if it has been diagnosed up to one year after retirement.
The third column in Table A.9 shows the respective ATETs. These are smaller and less
often signi¯cant than the cumulative health e®ects in the second column. Calculating the
di®erence between the cumulative and the short-run e®ects indicates that (i) much of the
adverse health e®ects accumulate within the ¯rst year after retirement, but also that (ii)
retirement continues to have adverse e®ects on health even one year after retirement. In
particular, the higher risk of developing arthritis or cancer would be underestimated if we
were only to observe health outcomes in the short-run.
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